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Abstract 
This chapter begins by reviewing two earlier historiographies of Islamic family law to illustrate the 
breadth and depth of the field. It then proceeds to examine the literature in three sections entitled 
What is Islamic family law? Who says so? And so what? The first section (what is it?) focusses largely 
on doctrinal scholarship on different substantive areas of law (including the contract of marriage, 
guardianship, dower, kafa’a, the spousal relationship, polygyny, divorce).  The second (who says so?) 
considers the literature that deals with the different loci of authority to interpret, legislate and enforce 
Islamic family law, or parts of it;  beyond the jurists and the body of fiqh literature, this involves 
notably  the courts and the state, in differing relationships and formulations, as well as scholarship 
that argues that academics have no business determining what it is or is not and should rather be 
asking different questions. The third section (and so what?) considers literature that engages with the 
implications of the increasingly unsettled  authority of apparently agreed-upon substance of Islamic 
family law, and the authority to pronounce thereon, that is, to say what it is. This growing body of 
scholarship engages with what Islamic family law could/should/might be and includes purposively 
engaged scholarship as well as examinations of activist alliances and the views of wider publics 
questioned about what they expect it to be – that is, what problems they expect this law to resolve.  
 
 
 
There are many ways of going about a historiography of Islamic family law for the 
purposes of this volume. For manageability and access, this is a story of English-language 
scholarship and is mostly focussed on the Middle East and North Africa, although I also  
refer to scholarship on legal practice in Muslim majority states in South and South East Asia 
and Africa, and in Muslim communities in Western Europe and North America.  For 
organizational purposes I approach the task with three questions in mind: What is Islamic 
family law? Who says so? And so what?   
  Two relatively recent historiographies of Islamic family law serve to orient my 
introduction. In 1999, Annelies Moors published a seminal reflection entitled ‘Debating 
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Islamic Family Law: Legal Texts and Social Practices’ in a collection reviewing the state of 
scholarship on women and gender in the Middle East.1 Framed as a response to the 1968 
claims of Anderson on ‘The Eclipse of the Patriarchal Family in Contemporary Islamic Law’, 
Moors’ review shows how the debates have been opened up by the entry into the field of 
differently placed scholars – notably women, and even more notably women from the region, 
and from disciplines other than law and what was then called Oriental Studies, such as those 
working in women’s and gender studies, anthropology and history.  The debates she covers 
focus on challenges to the idea of the traditional Muslim family, monolithic, unchanging, 
patriarchal, governed by the text of Islamic family law as understood from classical fiqh texts. 
The challenges are made through examination of different sources, including evidence of 
social practice as found in court records, fatwas and oral narratives. They show women in 
history exercising agency within the given framework, going to court, mobilising resources, 
negotiating, controlling property, and they seek to identify women’s voices in the telling of 
this history.  
Moors identifies this shift in perspectives to the late 1970s, and goes on to consider 
the role of the state, the relationship between the exigencies of post-colonial state-building, 
the construction of ideal family types as reflected in national codifications of Muslim 
‘personal status law’ (a term which Cuno shows to have entered Egyptian legal terminology 
via French colonial practice in Algeria2) and citizenship expectations and aspirations. She 
looks at the state’s organisation of its judiciary, the attitudes of the judiciary, at ‘Islamic 
modernity’, the rise of political Islam and ‘Islamic feminism’, women’s activism and the 
impact of and on family law of all these, as debated in the scholarship she reviews. To these 
areas – all still attracting scholarly interest – I would add the burgeoning scholarship on 
international human rights law and Islamic family law. Moors’ focus on gender as a lens 
through which to examine Islamic family law scholarship matches the development of gender 
as a theoretical construct more generally.  Of particular significance here is historian Judith 
Tucker’s Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law, published as one of the ‘themes in 
Islamic law’ series edited by Wael Hallaq and intended “to interpret the complexities of the 
subject for those entering the field for the first time.”3 The book is thus a landmark – and a 
considerable achievement -  in applying feminist legal theories and gender analysis to the 
historical articulations and current narratives of Islamic family law in a monograph intended 
as an introductory account of the substance. Appropriately, Tucker joins the more recent 
pattern of scholars in entering the text in the first person. 
 The second historiography, this time from a law and society perspective, comes from 
Susan Hirsch in 2006. Although a broader overview in that it looks at scholarship in Islamic 
law more generally (that is, not only family law and not only in the Middle East), the bulk of 
this review is on family law as “the substantive area of Islamic legal practice most prevalent 
in the world today.” 4 Hirsch situates her review in the post-9/11 world, reflecting on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Moors	  in	  Meriwether	  and	  Tucker	  (1999).	  Anderson	  1968.	  
2	  Cuno	  2015.	  
3	  Tucker	  2008.	  
4	  Hirsch,	  2006	  165.	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impact of those events on scholarship as well as on popular discourse and arguing that this 
scholarship “speaks to the thorny social and political challenges” post 9/11.5 She finds an 
emphasis on diversity in the practice of Islamic family law, and argues that the scholarship 
has as much value in its contribution to wider social theory as to the specific understandings 
of Islamic law. This stand against academic exceptionalism invokes the scholarship of Dupret 
and others reviewed here later. Hirsch begins with what she refers to as ‘source books’, one 
edited by An-Na`im within the framework of a larger project looking at the application of 
IFL in different parts of “a changing world”, and introduced by An-Na`im with a “plainly 
stated reformist agenda”; and the other by the network Women Living Under Muslim Laws 
with a specifically activist agenda, evaluating different applications and understandings of 
IFL with a view to suggesting which positions in state laws are more or less protective of 
women’s rights.6 Hirsh goes on to look inter alia at scholarship focussing on Islamic family 
law as one among other “competing normative orders”, at gender identity construction and 
intersectionality, at ethnographic work looking at women’s agency in and indeed beyond 
courts applying Islamic family law, at social movements advocating for law reform and at 
scholarship on Islamic family law practices in non-Muslim majority states. 
As should already be clear, then, English language scholarship on Islamic family law 
currently includes a variety of academic disciplines and methodologies, geographical focuses, 
and substantive themes. Some of the scholarship focuses on family law issues to explore 
another primary theme - for example, in historical work, the early origins and development of 
fiqh; or in contemporary ethnographic work, the way women use courts.  Outstanding 
examples of this in edited collections in the ‘Islamic law’ discipline are the volumes on 
Islamic Legal Interpretation (on muftis and fatwas)7 and Dispensing Justice (on judges and 
the courts).8 Outputs focused specifically on family law include monographs, articles 
(published in range of journals beyond the field of Islamic studies or indeed comparative 
law), edited collections on themes and geographical regions, websites, manuals for 
practitioners, multi-party collaborations and documentary films. Audiences, beyond 
academia, include policy makers and the wider public, Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers, 
activists and citizens. All of which brings us to the first question posed: what is Islamic 
family law? 
 
What is it? 
 Substantively, Islamic family law covers the heterosexual spousal relationship 
(marriage, its conduct and its termination by death or divorce), the parental relationship (legal 
recognition of the parent-child relationship or affiliation or legitimacy of birth and rights and 
obligations arising therefrom, child custody and guardianship), succession (although this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Hirsch	  2006	  166.	  
6	  Hirsh	  2006	  172;	  An-­‐Na`im	  2002;	  WLUML	  2003.	  	  See	  also	  Welchman	  2004.	  
7	  Masud,	  Messick	  and	  Powers	  (1996).	  See	  in	  this	  volume	  Motski,	  Masud,	  Haeri,	  Vogel,	  Layish.	  
8	  Masud,	  Peters	  and	  Powers	  (2006,	  2012).	  	  See	  in	  this	  volume	  Stiles,	  Bowen,	  Dupret,	  Johansen,	  Fierro,	  Masud,	  
Powers.	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often treated separately and will not be included here), and other family relationships in so far 
as they give rise to legally-regulated rights and obligations such as maintenance and 
responsibility for minors.  
 The classical jurists did not write of ‘family law’ as a distinct category; indeed, as no 
doubt explained elsewhere in this volume, the lack of distinct categorizations of substantive 
areas of law such as ‘contract’ and ‘family’, setting out a body of law recognizable as such by 
imperial and colonial visitors from other (Western, notably French and English) legal 
systems, was one of the reasons that fiqh was found to be, somehow, not quite ‘law’. I discuss 
further below scholarship on the entanglement of Islamic family law with the modernity 
discourses of colonial and imperial powers and modernizing elites in different states, and 
implications for the state-endorsed structure of the Muslim family. To begin with doctrine, 
however, an appropriate place to start is with the family law section of Issues in Islamic Law, 
the second of a recent three-volume collection of “the best and most influential contributions” 
to the debates on Islamic law edited by Mashood Baderin and situated by the publishers in the 
context of increased attention to Islamic law after the events of 9/11.9 The scholarship 
selected by Baderin in this volume presents the ‘classical’ fiqh debates and positions – in 
some cases as background to a comment on a recent development  or change – on the 
marriage contract,  the wife’s right to dower from her husband, the concept of kafa’a 
(equality) required of the husband, marriage guardianship, the marital relationship, polygyny, 
and divorce.10 The scholarship thus mostly comprises doctrinal examination of the sources 
and the differences between the schools on particular issues in Islamic family law.  
 
Marriage Contract Law and Doctrine 
Baderin’s selection includes some ‘classic’ older pieces as well as more recent 
articles, and thus illustrates the ways in which doctrinal approaches have developed. The first 
piece in the collection, for example, is a very short overview of marriage in Islamic law with 
an update on 20th century reforms in MENA states, and opens with an explanation of how 
pre-Islamic marriage law and practice (among Hijazi Arabs) was reformed by “the new law 
under Islam – the Shari`a”, specifically looking at Qur’anic provisions on the family that 
became the basis for fiqh formulations of the family.11 Khadduri’s consideration of the 
limitation on polygyny in particular takes us to the debate as to whether these changes to pre-
existing practice in the particular Hijazi context of the revelation were meant to coalesce into 
a fixed doctrine for all time and place, or whether, as he suggests, it was as far as it was 
possible to go at that time and place: “[t]he ultimate intent of Quranic marriage law, then, was 
to legitimate monogamy, rather than to endorse polygamy.”12 Reformist thinkers have 
focused on the importance of context in reading these and other Quranic verses related to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Baderin	  2014.	  
10	  Khadduri	  1978,	  Anderson	  1950,	  Ziadeh	  1957,	  Siddiqui	  1995,	  Carroll	  1987,	  Hinchcliffe	  1970,	  Kola	  2010,	  
Ahmad	  2009,	  Khan	  2009	  and	  Welchman	  2011.	  
11	  Khadduri	  1978	  213.	  
12	  Khadduri	  1978	  217.	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family;13  Leila Ahmed, in a highly significant text, makes a case for a different view of pre-
Islamic history and argues that women’s rights in general (and in the family in particular) 
were constrained (against the spirit of the Qur’an) during the first few centuries of Islam 
through the jurists working in their own context and time.14 And to see how the task of setting 
out the basic rules on Muslim marriage  is approached in 21st century scholarship, look no 
further than the fine contribution by Kecia Ali to the excellent 2008 collection on The Islamic 
Marriage Contract; Ali does the field a great service in setting out the basic rules on marriage 
in classical fiqh, indicating main differences between the four Sunni schools and Ja`afari 
doctrine.15 
Baderin’s second choice is a classic article by JND Anderson, an in-depth 
presentation of “one of the most bewildering problems in Muslim law”, that is “the 
classification and effect of various types of invalid marriage contract”,16 focusing here on the 
differences within the Hanafi school on which type of contract belongs in which category 
(void or invalid/irregular), why and with what legal effects. Anderson has already been 
mentioned above in reference to Moors’ critique of his article on the ‘eclipse of the 
patriarchal family.’ Of the relevant scholars of Islamic law writing in the West in the 1950s-
1970s and whose scholarship is often characterised as ‘Orientalist’ in the Saidian sense,17  it 
was JND Anderson who wrote most prolifically on Islamic family law.  In particular, it was 
Anderson who followed the codifications of family law issued by independent Arab states in 
the 1950s in what I have called the second phase of Muslim family law reform.18 This part of 
Anderson’s body of work is still quoted in contemporary scholarship looking at text and court 
application;19 and it is worth remembering that it was considerably more difficult then to 
physically get hold of new legislation from different parts of the world. In retrospect of 
course, this body of work presents as ‘looking for shari`a in the law,’ as compared to the 
traditional jurists ‘looking for law in the shari`a’, and presumably falls foul of Dupret’s 
admonition, discussed further below (under ‘who says so?), with regard to scholars judging 
what is and is not ‘Islamic’ in law and legal practice.20 
Anderson’s tone is distinctly of its time, but his much-quoted observation in regard to 
family law, that “Muslims have regarded that law as partaking most closely of the very warp 
and weft of their religion,”21  goes to the familiar and current assertion that family law is 
inextricably tied up with religion in Muslim communities. This assumption has recently been 
challenged by Cuno’s historical examination of the development of the relationship between 
Muslim family law and the state in Egypt from the late 19th century, in particular judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  2003	  11.	  
14	  Ahmed	  1992.	  
15	  Ali	  in	  Quraishi	  and	  Vogel	  (2008).	  For	  an	  older	  text	  on	  the	  contract	  see	  El	  Alami	  1992.	  
16	  Anderson	  1950	  357.	  
17	  Said	  1978.	  
18	  Welchman	  (2007);	  Anderson	  1950,	  1951,	  1952,	  1955,	  1960.	  Jeppie,	  Moosa	  and	  Roberts	  (2010)	  identify	  
Anderson’s	  Islamic	  Law	  in	  Africa	  as	  his	  first	  major	  publication	  and	  note	  that	  he	  “took	  the	  colonial	  context	  for	  
granted”	  (p.21).	  
19	  See	  Van	  Eijk	  (2012).	  
20	  Dupret	  2006,	  2007.	  
21	  Anderson	  1976	  p.17.	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reorganisation and the consequent reduction in jurisdiction of shari`a courts. Cuno finds that 
“the close association of the family with religion and religious law” was “a contingent 
development and neither inevitable nor an expression of ‘the centrality of the family in 
Islam,’ as often claimed. [...] Colonial scholarship produced the idea that family law is the 
‘heart’ of the Sharia.”22   Neither the fact that public opinion surveys carried out in certain 
Muslim majority countries suggest a preference for “shari`a-based” law in family regulation, 
nor scholarship on the conduct of ‘Islamic marriages’ in minority Muslim communities in the 
West, necessarily detract from Cuno’s assertion that this is how colonial modernity has fixed 
the relationship.  
Anderson’s article commences with an examination of Abu Hanifa’s views of 
contracts other than the contract of marriage, to show that the latter applied “exactly the same 
principles and method of reasoning” to the contract of marriage: Abu Hanifa was, according 
to Anderson, “relentlessly logical”.23 The issue of the validity of the contract is of enormous 
importance: “Marriage is a contract of civil law” according to Schacht, and “[t]his contract is 
the only legally relevant act in concluding marriage.”24  In other words, it is not a sacrament 
and no religious ceremony (alone) or the involvement of religious personnel constitutes or are 
required for the valid performance of this contract. Nevertheless, Mir-Hosseini notes that 
while the legal form of marriage is dealt with under the status of mu`amalat (social 
transactions), jurists “often speak of marriage as an act of worship (`ibada)”, thus making 
marriage “one of the very few contracts in fiqh that crosses that boundary between `ibadat 
and mu`amalat”.25 For Mir-Hosseini, this is tied up with the social context in which the 
jurists were reading the revelation, and has consequences for the way in which rules 
regarding women and gender more generally – but particularly in the family – were and are 
constructed by jurists down the centuries, and how arguments against changes in these rules 
are framed now, how ideas of normativity develop among different communities. These 
angles were not of such interest to Anderson or his peers, although Fyzee insisted on this 
point (marriage being both mu`amala and `ibada) from the perspective of a practitioner.26 
 
The Mahr: Contract, Property and Gender 
The wife’s right to dower – arising at and from the contract, although also connected 
with consummation - is a matter that has drawn the attention of scholars interested beyond 
the law as narrowly interpreted as it illustrates women’s access to property, the transfer of 
property through generations and social practice in different times and places as evidenced by 
various forms of records. Thus Rapoport investigates extant early Islamic marriage and 
divorce deeds in Egypt from the 8th century CE onwards as well as the jurists’ discussions on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Cuno	  (2015)	  183-­‐4;	  citing	  (critiquing)	  Esposito	  with	  Delong	  Bas	  (2001)	  xiv.	  
23	  Anderson	  1950	  358,	  357.	  
24	  Schacht	  1964	  p.161.	  
25	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  2003	  11.	  See	  also	  Kecia	  Ali	  (2008);	  Tucker	  (2008)	  41;	  Sonbol	  (2008)	  114;	  Shaheen	  Ali	  1996	  162;	  
Lindbekk	  2014;	  Fyzee	  1974	  89-­‐90.	  
26	  Fyzee	  1974,	  89-­‐90.	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the validity of deferral of part of the dower, 27 comparing this Egyptian position to those taken 
by jurists elsewhere to establish a link with social practice. Rapoport argues that evidence of 
an increasingly common practice of recording deferred dower undermines arguments (here he 
cites Ahmed) that the second and third centuries of Islam were detrimental to the position of 
women.28 At the same time, he examines matrimonial gifts more broadly, including among 
Jews and Copts in Egypt, to make a broader argument about “the interaction of nascent 
Islamic law and local marriage practices” which he finds to have “influenced and transformed 
both the views of Muslim jurists and the actual marriage settlements”.29  
 Women’s access to property through dower (as well as through inheritance) has also 
been investigated in depth since the 1990s. Moors traces dower patterns in Jabal Nablus in 
Palestine over the course of the twentieth century, tracing an increase in deferred dower over 
prompt and the rise of the token dower, an “innovation of the modernizing elite”30  although 
accompanied by the increasing registration of household goods and gold. Attending to 
differences between women (social class and employment, as well as urban/rural differences) 
and drawing on oral narratives as well as court records and legal texts, Moors investigates 
discrepancies between the dower registered in contracts and that actually received by the 
bride. This involves not only the earlier practice of the bride’s father retaining a proportion of 
the dower,31 but the reasons why wives do not necessarily claim their full dower from their 
husbands or, in the case of widows, renounce their deferred dower in favour of their children 
(in cases where they have at least one son). Moors situates changes in dower patterns in “the 
context of changing property relations and changes in the meanings of gender,”32 with 
increasing emphasis on the conjugal family and a growing emphasis on the husband as 
provider. In company with other scholars, Moors has shown how women from different 
classes use the institution of dower within informal strategies for the protection of their rights 
including protection against divorce from their husband, or in support of their own demand 
for divorce.33In Iran, where law requires that a cash amount of dower is to be adjusted to 
allow for inflation, Mir-Hosseini similarly observes the way the wife may exercise her right 
to demand payment of her dower in order to persuade a husband to divorce her, or to agree to 
other changes that she wishes to see in her marriage.34 
 The issue of dower has also been a focus of scholarship examining the way in which 
courts in non-Muslim majority countries deal with Islamic family law, a body of work that 
has grown as the case law grows.  Pascale Fournier’s Muslim Marriage in Western Courts 
lucidly examines the meanings of dower as it ‘travels’ to courts in North America, France and 
Germany.35 Lau and Freeman trace the earliest leading case in English law to 1965 and note 
the preference of English courts to invoke principles of contract law rather than matrimonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Rapoport	  2000.	  	  
28	  Rapoport	  2000	  21.	  	  
29	  Ibid	  p	  4.	  
30	  Moors	  1995	  309.	  See	  by	  contrast	  Wynn	  (2008).	  
31	  See	  also	  Stiles	  2014.	  
32	  Moors	  1995	  325.	  
33	  Moors	  1995;	  Wynn	  1996;	  Hoodfar	  1996;	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  1993	  72-­‐83.	  
34	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  2007	  120.	  See	  also	  Longinotto	  and	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  (1998).	  
35	  Fournier	  (2010).	  	  See	  also	  Yassari	  (2013);	  Jones-­‐Pauly	  (2008);	  Quriashi	  and	  Syeed-­‐Millar	  (2004)	  200-­‐208	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law in such cases.36 Quraishi and Syeed-Miller  note that in Muslim marriage contracts in the 
US, there seems to be “only one thing really important that would not otherwise be included 
in a standard civil marriage licence”– that is, the dower.37 Their examination includes the 
social debate as to whether dower should be rejected (or converted into a ‘token’) because in 
effect it puts “a monetary value on the bride”,  or whether it should  be seen rather, as in the 
case of deferred dower,  as security for the eventuality of death or divorce and as a deterrent 
against unilateral divorce.38 This discussion has also been common in the Middle East and 
North Africa; in Algeria, Lazreg notes that despite feminists holding dower to be “an 
antiquated custom that objectifies women” it remains a major feature of marriage.39 Calls of 
different groups are recorded for dower to be reduced particularly in critical periods of 
national history, while scholarship maps ways of subverting officially decreed upper limits on 
dower.40 While law may regulate what can be claimed in court from whom and when, 
scholarship increasingly confirms that social practice and strategic action provide the real 
meanings of dower.41 
 
Kafa’a: Suitors, Suitability, and Stratification 
Other requirements arising at the contract of marriage have also attracted scholarly 
attention that departs in its framing (and sometimes its findings) from earlier considerations 
of these areas of Islamic family law.  Farhat Ziadeh opens his early piece on the concept of 
kafa’a (suitability, or equality as Ziadeh has it) by observing that perhaps “no criterion is 
more indicative of social stratification among a group than that of whom they consider equal 
to, and therefore worthy of, marrying their daughters”.42 This encapsulates two key points in 
regard to kafa’a: firstly, it is a measure that distinguishes between otherwise apparently 
equally situated Muslims, and secondly that it “requires the husband to ‘measure up’ to the 
wife and not vice versa.”43 Kafa’a is originally a Hanafi doctrine and attributed to the 
influences of the social environment in Iraq in which early Hanafi jurists were working. 
Looking into the early jurisprudential debates and the sources invoked for and against the 
doctrine,  Ziadeh finds that “there can be no doubt that there is a preponderance of evidence 
to show that kafa’ah is contrary to the spirit of Islam.”44 This again invokes more recent 
scholarship arguing that many fiqh rules on marriage were developed as a result not of the 
substance of revelation but of the jurists’ own living and working environments.  
 At the end of his piece Ziadeh provides two famous cases regarding kafa’a in the 
early twentieth century, one in Egypt and one from the Alawi community in Singapore. 
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  Ibid	  189.	  
39	  Lazreg	  1994	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Although he finds (in 1957) that as a legal doctrine, kafa’a has waning force, it is included in 
reduced form in different formulations of family law codes in Arab states. Kafa’a applies at 
the time of the contract, and as Khalid al-Azri explains in a recent and in depth study, it is 
closely connected with the authority of the guardian; in his view, “guardianship and kafa’a 
exist to control the aptitude of a woman in her marriage selection.”45 Al-Azri’s examination 
of kafa’a includes jurisprudential analysis of diverse opinions on kafa’a between and among 
Sunni schools and Ibadi scholars (the Shi`a do not recognise it46) as well as social perceptions 
(including a lively internet discussion) and court practice in Oman. He sets his discussion 
clearly in the social and political context, traces cases through court records to show judges 
coming to different conclusions on how to apply the doctrine, considers the background and 
training of different judges and the tensions between Ibadi doctrine, the Omani Personal 
Status Law, and the Basic Law’s guarantee of non-discrimination on grounds of (inter alia) 
gender, origin and social status. Another recent contribution to the scholarship on kafa’a 
comes from Malaysia, where Noor and Lee trace acrimonious debates in the early 20th 
century between members of the Hadrami-origin Arabs divided into sayyids (claiming 
descent from the Prophet) and non-sayyids.47 The former applied the principle of kafa’a to 
restrict sayyid women to marriage with sayyid men only, excluding other Arabs as well as 
everybody else; the  non-sayyid community objected on the grounds of the general principle 
of equality in Islam, while in some reported cases objecting to women from their own 
community marrying non-Arabs.  
Wilaya: Guardianship, Agency and Gender 
 The broader notion of male guardianship over women is seen by some Muslim 
feminist scholars as part of the “DNA of patriarchy” in fiqh.48 Marriage guardianship over 
minors and in some cases over adult women was an issue much discussed among the classical 
jurists and is immediately connected with the issue of consent: whether the woman needs her 
guardian’s to her marriage, and whether he needs her consent to marry her off.49 The Hanafi 
and the Shi`a traditionally allowed adult women to contract their own marriage without the 
guardian’s consent, and this theoretical position has been substantiated by social historians 
who have found evidence of women exercising this right at different times and in different 
places – with the support of courts and muftis while in opposition to social practice and 
customary expectations.50 Social norms in different Muslim communities may continue to 
expect a woman, particularly at her first marriage, to have the approval of her family 
guardian, whether or not this is required in law. Stiles’ recent ethnographic work in and 
beyond a Zanzibari shari`a court explores the increasing willingness of young women to take 
their fathers to court demanding the right to marry the man of their choice; Stiles’ interest lies 
also in exploring the impact of a greater awareness of Islamic law on the part of young 
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  2010,	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  2013.	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  2015	  35.	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  1998	  50-­‐51	  
	  10	  
	  
women in decisions both to challenge their elders and to refrain from so doing. 51   In Pakistan 
in the 1990s, considerations by Ali and Lau of a widely publicised case on a woman’s right to 
marry without her guardian’s consent situate the court’s deliberations not only in terms of 
Hanafi law and statutory interventions but the ways in which judges’ statements reflected the 
primacy of social expectations beyond the  letter of the law.52 The case involved the young 
woman fleeing to a women’s refuge following her father’s attempt to have her marriage 
contract cancelled; the case was raised by the father against the refuge for abduction. The 
challenge to familial and social expectations of the guardian’s involvement in a woman’s 
marriage, and woman’s “right to marry”, thus entangle different bodies of law and different 
social actors, which scholarship now addresses also in terms of constitutional guarantees of 
equality and habeas corpus in a human rights perspective.53  
 On the other hand, the marriage of minors (where legal consent to the contract is 
given by the guardian) has been a continuing focus of historical scholarship, often examining 
the ‘option of puberty’ which under Hanafi law could be exercised by a female married in her 
minority by a guardian other than her father or paternal grandfather to exit a marriage upon 
reaching puberty. Messick’s account of a young woman doing precisely this in mid-twentieth 
century Yemen, reconstructed from a series of court records, is an arresting account of how 
the rules and gendered assumptions of female behaviour in this regard played out “in the last 
decades of Shari`a law application under an indigenous Islamic state.”54 Messick also 
observes that the young woman involved “must have had good legal advice”, while Motzki 
suggests on the basis of evidence from 17th century Palestine, to the effect that the option of 
puberty was commonly invoked, that there was widespread awareness of this rule. 55 Yazbek 
agrees, also working on the Palestine court records but in the 19th century, reflecting on the 
“weight of the male gaze” in the records, speculating as to what strategies were involved in 
bringing cases to court, and wondering at explicit descriptions by (only just) pubescent girls 
of sexual intercourse and menstruation.56 Tucker considers the apparently straightforward 
position of Hanafi muftis supporting the need for an adult woman’s consent to her marriage 
compared to court cases, in seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 
to wonder about the extent to which social norms of male control were actually 
accommodated in practice while the formalities of the woman’s consent were attended to in 
the written record.57 On the other hand, she has also noted that the “seemingly widespread 
practice of appointing mothers as guardians in the Ottoman period is one more instance of the 
society’s view of women as appropriate and competent managers of private property.”58 
 The marriage of minors is statutorily less countenanced now, but the 21st century 
witnessed a rise in scholarship (as well as advocacy) on “forced marriage”, drawing on and 
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contributing to wider concepts of choice, consent and coercion.59 While in the UK for 
example the scholarship insists on not making this a ‘Muslim issue’, Bano uses the example 
of the role of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal to consider the implications more broadly of 
“the increasing privatisation of disputes,” feeding into a wider debate on the use of mediation 
mechanisms in situations of serious power imbalances.60 The South Asian country studies in 
Hossain’s 2014 handbook for lawyers include background on the statutory regulation of 
Muslim marriage (as well as Christian and Hindu marriage), including the position on minor 
marriage, as well as constitutional guarantees, civil and criminal remedies for forced 
marriage.61  
Polygyny, Divorce, and Pluri-Legality 
 Similarly, Islamic family law rules on polygyny and divorce are increasingly 
addressed in scholarship invoking not only Islamic family law rules and statutory 
developments in different states but also international human rights law. 62   21st century 
scholarship may focus on the fact that polygyny and unilateral divorce (talaq), as 
prerogatives of men, are easily framed as contradicting the norms of equality and non-
discrimination. An example of earlier scholarship that did not refer to this frame is provided 
by Hinchcliffe (1970), while Mashour’s 2005 article illustrates the distance (and the 
direction) that scholarship in this area travelled in three and a half decades – not least the fact 
that the latter piece is published not in a journal focussing on Islamic law or Muslim matters 
more generally but in an established human rights journal and includes “gender equality” in 
its title.63 A recent piece from South East Asia notes proposals for reform to Malaysian law 
and procedure by women’s groups but focuses on controlling abuse of the institution, notably 
by men who engage in ‘forum-shopping’ to avoid the involvement of their existing wife in 
the procedures to obtain permission for a polygynous marriage, or who cross national borders 
to conclude contracts under different rules, or who simply fail to register them.64 Yamani’s 
study of polygyny in Saudi Arabia includes legal analysis of both the classical Sunni law and 
Saudi regulations and beyond this provides an explicitly “insider” perspective on this debate, 
including an examination of the “nationalist, Islamic, political debate, which automatically 
labels any form of regulation of the practice and its management as a sign of heresy, a mark 
of joining in with the anti-Islamic Western conspiracy.”65   
Legal pluralism analyses address not only unregistered polygynous marriages in parts 
of the Muslim world but also polygynous unions among Muslim communities in Western 
states; Shah for example examines English court cases in support of his broader argument 
that “a dominant legal system is ill-advised to attempt to impose a mono-cultural and ethno 
centric regime upon a legally pluralist social base.”66 Elsewhere in the Middle East and North 
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Africa, polygyny has been treated through a consideration of the restrictions imposed by 
statute and the connected issue of registration requirements.67 Najjar’s discussion of the 
public and parliamentary debates on the 1979 Egyptian law’s option of divorce for a first 
wife without having to prove harm, but rather from the bare fact of a polygynous marriage by 
her husband (a provision withdrawn in 1985) was a relatively early contemporary foray into 
documenting the environment surrounding particular legislative reforms; this kind of effort is 
of course facilitated in more recent times by social media, on-line records and other 
electronic resources.68  
 Besides its highly gendered nature, Islamic family law regulation of polygyny is 
connected to the rules on divorce through the recurring issue of stipulations in the marriage 
contract: and in particular, stipulations securing the wife a delegated power of talaq either in 
general terms or in the event that a husband contracts a polygynous union or other 
formulations seeking to prevent the husband from so doing. Some of the most interesting 
scholarship on the delegation to the wife of the husband’s power of talaq relates to South 
Asian jurisdictions. The dominance of the Hanafi school, with its very restricted grounds on 
which women could petition the court for judicial divorce, is the context of Khan’s 
consideration of a fatwa from a prominent Indian jurist in the early 1930s on the need for 
reform in divorce law.69 The regional context included the validity of Muslim wives using 
apostasy from Islam as a “legal device” to dissolve their marriages in the absence of other 
options. This was a strategy encouraged by certain Christian missionaries, an issue discussed 
in depth by Masud who notes that “[i]t was this fatwa that triggered the movement for Islamic 
legal reform in India” leading eventually to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939.70 
Khan examines the part of the fatwa dealing with the husband’s delegation of talaq to his 
wife, and includes an incisive and very 21st century reading of Thanawi’s “important 
counsel” on “women’s intellectual deficiency”.71 Somewhat similar procedural rules were 
included in Fyzee’s ‘Agreement for Dissolution of Marriage’ which was drafted in the 1960s 
with his assistance by a Bombay solicitors’ firm “at the instance of” a woman whom Fyzee 
describes as “a prominent worker in the cause of women’s rights.”72 Recalling this in her own 
1982 consideration of delegated divorce, Carroll notes the continuing utility of this approach 
at contract in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: “the grounds on which the wife is authorized to 
exercise her delegated right of divorce are so broad that the matrimonial power-balance in 
regard to dissolution of marriage is substantially equalized.”73 Carroll’s article on stipulations 
in the marriage contract focuses mostly on stipulations against polygyny and for delegated 
divorce, but she also looks at other stipulations for example on post-divorce maintenance and 
the residence of the spouses, and her piece tracks how the different rights and obligations 
arising from the contract arise in interaction with special stipulations. She examines Indian 
cases from the early twentieth century and how the courts invoked the requirements of 
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‘public policy’ to (often) uphold the wife’s stipulations, coming up to date with more recent 
cases and concluding with the space provided in Pakistani and Bangladeshi marriage 
registration forms for such conditions to be included, noting a lack of information on whether 
and how such options have been exercised.74 Her article has the advocate’s engagement: she 
wonders “what, if any, efforts women’s organizations are making to popularize the use” of 
Fyzee’s model agreement.75 Later in the following decade, Carroll worked with the network 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) to publish a “toolkit” on delegated divorce.76 
The engagement of scholars and activists, in particular in regard to women’s rights and 
options and with a view to a different constituency and audience for this scholarship, is 
discussed in the third section below (“So What?”), but it is worth noting here that Carroll and 
WLUML also treated the complex issue of a wife’s post-divorce maintenance in a collection 
issued on the tenth anniversary of the famous Indian case of Shah Bano.77  
 Another region-specific issue is that of triple talaq, by which a husband ends his 
marriage finally and irrevocably, and requiring an intervening marriage by the wife should 
the couple wish to re-marry. Ahmad’s 2009 “critical appraisal” of this “abominable practice” 
by Muslim husbands in India investigates mainly the “Qur`anic philosophy” on divorce, 
sources from the hadith of the Prophet and the early caliphs and jurists.78 The sources 
invoked, and the tone of insider outrage, distinguish this doctrinal piece for a more general 
audience. On the other hand, in the Middle East and North Africa, where codifications of 
family law have mostly dealt with the challenge of triple talaq by rendering such formulae as 
a single revocable divorce, Agmon has suggested from her reading of late Ottoman court 
records that “many marital disputes [...] give us the impression that women sometimes found 
ways to provoke their husbands into making the talaq call, thus obtaining the divorce”.79 
Moors similarly includes the abolishing of conditional and triple talaq as examples of 
reforms that “do not always work to women’s benefit; in the past, women have made 
selective and strategic use of these in order to bring about a desired divorce.”80  
Historians have demonstrated that women’s access to divorce was considerably wider 
in court practice than might have been assumed under ruling authorities that privileged 
Hanafi fiqh. Tucker’s evidence shows that muftis would recommend that a Hanafi judge 
transfer the case to a deputy from another Sunni school who would grant a divorce on 
grounds not available from the Hanafi sources.81 Abdal-Rehim’s study of Egyptian court 
records from the late 16th century includes examples of khul` divorce, in traditional fiqh a 
form of divorce initiated by the wife who in return for the husband’s talaq renounces her 
remaining financial rights (maintenance and deferred dower) and sometimes repays dower 
already received. Particularly noteworthy here is his finding that the judge would enforce a 
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khul` petition from the wife “even when the husband was not willing to go through with it.”82 
Other historians, examining evidence from different times and places, disagree.83 
 The issue of “judicial khul`”, in the sense of a khul` divorce pronounced by the court 
in the absence of consent from the husband, has been addressed by doctrinal scholarship on 
the Middle East and North Africa since the Egyptian law of 2000 providing for this form of 
divorce; scholars of South Asian law had dealt previously with the 1967 Pakistani precedent 
establishing judicial khul`.84 Arabi provides an in depth consideration of relevant Maliki 
rulings and the constitutional developments in Egypt that he argues led to the promulgation of 
this law;85 others have noted the sheer length of time it took to press a claim for judicial 
divorce through the Egyptian court system.86 The title of Arabi’s piece indicates what he 
clearly considers the momentous nature of this legislative intervention as well as something 
of the tenor of public reaction (“women may divorce at will”); Sonneveld says that “the 
Egyptian nation was rocked” by the new law; El Alami calls it “nothing short of 
revolutionary”.87 Scholarship on khul` and indeed other forms of divorce in the Muslim world 
has deployed new methodologies and new theoretical frames that are discussed further below 
(“Who says so?”).  
Authority and the Marital Relationship 
 Male prerogative in traditional fiqh on divorce has been identified as a key part of the 
overall conception of male authority in marriage and the family (qiwama and wilaya);88 for 
some, the press and public debates on khul` in the Middle East essentially revolve around the 
challenge to male authority raised by the idea of women being able to exit the marriage 
without proving fault on the part of the husband.89 In the marital relationship, Kecia Ali 
establishes the husband’s authority in classical fiqh as follows: “The husband’s main right is 
to derive sexual enjoyment from his wife, and to that end he may exercise control over her 
mobility.”90 Compare this to Anderson’s earlier presentation: “Broadly speaking, the marital 
relationship envisaged in the traditional law may be summed up in terms of a wife’s duty to 
obey her husband in every lawful demand he may make – provided only that he has given her 
her ‘prompt’ dower – in consideration for his duty to provide her with suitable maintenance 
and support.”91 What Moors has termed the “gender contract” and Sonneveld the 
“maintenance-obedience relation” has been summed up by Tucker as “the marital bargain of 
nafaqa [maintenance] for absence of nushuz [disobedience]” which, together with 
guardianship, she finds to have been “constants in Islamic marriage”, the great diversity in 
rules notwithstanding; despite the limitations on the husband’s authority – upheld by the 
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jurists – “nushuz could not but be a defining concept for marital relations”.92 This does not 
contradict Cuno’s finding that the application of the “legal formulation” of obedience rules 
“in real life varied according to the economic and social status of the household”.93  
Cuno’s particular consideration of the “curious case of the house of obedience” 
focuses on the changes in Egyptian procedural rules and court system in the nineteenth 
century, accompanied by the emerging “new family ideology” on the part of the elite in 
Egypt: he finds, like Sonbol before him, that the enforcement of this concept, in the sense of 
the court being empowered to return a ‘disobedient’ wife to her husband’s house against her 
will, was an invention of the late nineteenth century.94 Their scholarship from court records 
establishes that prior to this, the sanction of the court was to hold the wife no longer entitled 
to maintenance from her husband, which is similar to the situation pertaining now in those 
MENA states that maintain the concept of ‘obedience’ in their laws. Cuno traces the coercive 
enforcement of ‘obedience’ orders in Egypt to France, via Algeria: “French   colonial 
knowledge of Muslim family law was the likely vector of its transmission to Egypt.”95 This 
scholarship explicitly challenges assumptions about what Cuno calls the “infamous legal 
regime” of the ‘house of obedience’ and pins it clearly on “legal modernization”.96 
 Scholarship carried out on the maintenance-obedience relationship in current or at 
least more recent practice includes examination of how the different claims of husband and 
wife are managed by courts and indeed - often strategically – by husbands, wives, families 
and wider communities.97 A feature of the scholarship discussed further below is the 
“growing disconnect” between the normative model of marriage with the husband as 
provider, and the implications this has for perceptions of law. But another area of academic – 
as well as activist – focus in recent years has been special stipulations inserted in marriage 
contracts, which have the potential of modifying the effects that otherwise flow from the fact 
of the contract and notably of clarifying the circumstances in which a wife would not be held 
to be in a state of nushuz. Anderson deals with this issue briefly in his monograph on law 
reform, while El Alami mentions it only in passing (in discussing polygyny).98 Anderson’s 
1976 comment on practice (repeated from an earlier analysis of the then new Jordanian law 
of 1951) is illustrative of the way that attention to practice has changed in scholarship on 
MENA law: “I am told […] that the insertion of such stipulations in marriage contracts is 
today the rule rather than the exception in upper class families in Jordan, and is becoming 
increasingly common in all classes."99 Subsequent scholarship researched marriage contracts 
in court records in neighbouring Israel and Palestine with a view to ascertaining usage and 
scope.100 Similarly, later doctrinal scholarship devotes more time to stipulations in the 
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marriage contract,101 and the 2008 edited volume on The Islamic Marriage Contract includes  
a number of articles specifically focussed on stipulations.102 Interestingly, two of the chapter 
authors indicate a change in position from their earlier (late 1990s) considerations of 
stipulations in the contract.103 
But Anderson’s 1976 comment on the motivation on the part of the legislators in 
expanding prospects for the enforcement of stipulations is perceptive: the intention was not 
only to provide relief in certain situations (that is, divorce) but to give wives “a measure of 
control over their own circumstances and those of their children.”104 This comment provides 
context for historical scholarship that, from the 1990s, establishes that in certain places in 
past centuries, in the earliest Islamic centuries and indeed from pre-Islamic times, it was 
commonplace for the wife (or her guardian on her behalf) to insert conditions in the contract 
and that it was routine for courts to enforce them, in the sense of not holding her disobedient 
or in granting her a divorce should the circumstance stipulated against arise.105 Hanna has 
explained part of the significance of this scholarship in relation to the “Oriental Despot 
model, developed with regard to the state,” which she argues “has often been applied to the 
family in the premodern period, either in explicit or implicit terms.”106 Largueche’s work on 
the “Kairouan marriage contract” (routinely stipulating monogamy) supports these efforts 
(“real history could be lived very differently to the ideals transmitted in doctrine”).107 Sonbol 
and Cuno argue that modernizing reforms to the Egyptian legal system in the 19th and early 
20th centuries essentially closed the space previously accorded to negotiations on the shape of 
the contract and gave women considerably less control over the terms of their marriage than 
they had had pre-reform. Cuno uses this as well as associated reforms such as the 
‘Hanafization’ of Egyptian legal practice in family law to dispute the “standard narrative” 
that family law remained untouched by legal reforms until the codes of the twentieth 
century.108 Sonbol in particular insists that women’s (and indeed men’s) insertion of 
stipulations should not be viewed in the first instance as having conditions of divorce 
secured, but rather as revealing, for specific historical contexts, “the expectations of a broad 
range of people” in regard to how their marriage would be lived, as well as illustrating 
women’s agency in exerting a certain degree of control.109 Women largely stopped inserting 
stipulations in the newly issued marriage contract forms over the 20th century, and even more 
recent research confirms that, in Egypt at least, judicial practice does not generally see 
stipulations as enforceable, with the exception of the delegation of talaq.110 Still, at the end of 
the twentieth century, the “New Marriage Contract” campaign in Egypt produced 
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considerable scholarship from both observers and insiders: Zulficar, involved closely as the 
drafter of the document, notes in regard to the Egyptian women’s movement that “we 
reclaimed our right to redefine our cultural heritage as Muslim women under the principles of 
shari`a.”111   
Zulficar’s statement implicitly supports the more recent assertion by Sharafedin, who 
notes, in an article on Egyptian family law, that fiqh produced by the jurists was “sometimes 
different” from the practice of law in the shari`a courts in history: “[t]his is why we may 
have two interrelated but different manifestations of ‘Islamic law.’”112 In this, she follows 
Sonbol’s earlier argument that, given the historical evidence of the disparities between fiqh 
manuals and court practice, “we should reconsider the idea that what fiqh has to say is 
synonymous with Shari`a.”113 The state comes next, with its codifications of Islamic family 
law and integration of the court system, and the colonial and post-colonial retention of 
“shari`a” jurisdiction, in one way or another, in Muslim family law matters led to the 
assertion that family law was indeed the “last bastion” or the “last stronghold” of the shari`a 
in many Muslim majority states: or, more accurately as Moors puts it, the “last stronghold of 
the shar`i establishment.”114 Cuno, following Messick, disputes that this was inevitable, 
arguing that “colonial-era scholars identified family law as the ‘core’ or the ‘heart’ of the 
shari`a.”115 Tucker has wondered “[w]hether Islamic law retains any central identity or rather 
has devolved into fragmented sets of rules deployed for various purposes of politics and 
power.”116 And for his part, Dupret challenges scholars on the assumption “that personal 
status is, in Egypt and in many other Arab countries, the last stronghold of Islamic law.”117 
Dupret’s challenge is methodological, disputing the way scholars frame their research into 
legal practice in Muslim majority states – in this work, personal status law in Egypt – arguing 
that “law is a practical accomplishment not an archaeological search for the Islamic pedigree 
of the norm.”118 All of which brings us to the second question: Who says what Islamic family 
law is? 
 
Who says so? 
 It is certainly a commonplace to assert the diversity of Islamic family law, whether in 
relation to the differences within and between the traditional schools of law on different 
specific subjects, or in relation to practice in today’s world of states, codified laws, courts 
applying them, and engaged citizens demanding change.  Here, a useful distinction has been 
made between “discourses on the law” (public, political and religious debates) and 
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“discourses of the law […] (the practices of judges, lawyers and litigants).”119 Some of the 
most interesting recent historical scholarship looks at Islamic family law in practice with a 
view to hearing voices (judges, litigants) other than those heard through the fiqh literature and 
particularly the manuals of the schools. But it is with the advent of the state (colonial and 
post-colonial) that we really see what Tucker has referred to as an “epistemological break in 
the legal system” and the concerted questioning of who gets to say what Islamic family law 
is. 
 The codification of Islamic family law in the modern period constitutes “an alteration 
far more consequential than the move to a new framework of numbered articles might seem 
to indicate”, including the passing of “a key dimension of interpretive authority” from 
individual jurists “to the collective bodies of national legislatures.”120 Even if the state agrees 
that what it legislates is not the only valid expression of Islamic family law, its enforcement 
and recognition of certain rules and acts seek to construct ‘the family’ under Islamic law in 
particular forms.121 From the 1950s on, JND Anderson tracked the substance of details of the 
family law codifications in the Middle East and North Africa in detailed commentaries on the 
statutes and their origins in different fiqh sources, but without attempting to investigate their 
application himself. Anderson’s scholarship is of its time, with a generally uncomplicated 
attitude to ‘reform’ and a positivist approach to ‘law’, legislation and the state. Noel Coulson 
published less specifically on family law (apart from inheritance) and did occasionally 
express reservations as to the application of Arab state codifications beyond the urban elite, 
referring to particular cases or trends in courts in different countries that had been reported to 
him.122 More broadly, however, in commenting on what he termed the “modern process of 
comparative law” employed by states to design family laws appropriate to their societies by 
drawing on the range of views available on different matters in fiqh, Coulson called this “a 
healthy process of social purpose” and noted that “[t]he status of women has been 
immeasurably improved.”123  
 The assumptions behind such statements by earlier scholars have been challenged 
since the mid-1990s by historians on a number of levels. Both Tucker and Sonbol question 
whether reforms of the late nineteenth and early 20th centuries under the Ottomans and in 
Egypt were an unadulterated good for women in particular.124 Sonbol looks at cases before 
and after the Egyptian reforms and concludes they proved “a mixed bag for Egyptian 
women.”125 Tucker focuses on the range of opportunities in fiqh compared to the limitations 
imposed by the Ottoman Law of Family Rights (1917), and in her later book weighs the 
benefits of the substantive reforms as “offset by the loss of the leeway built into the 
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traditional Islamic legal system.”126 The comparison between the ‘openness’ of the pre-
modern fiqh system and the ‘closed’ nature of the code (often expressed as flexibility versus 
rigidity) is emphasised by other scholars working with historical material.127 The way in 
which states selected particular fiqh rulings to construct their ideal-type Muslim family under 
their statutory interventions is described by Sonbol as a process of “state patriarchy”, an 
interesting foil to Anderson’s description of the “eclipse of the patriarchal family”.128 The 
extent of the difference between Islamic family law and practice before the reforms and after, 
she says, merits the current manifestation being called “a new shari`a”.129 The crystallization 
of this ‘new’ Islamic family law, under pressures of colonialism, imperialism and state 
formation, and later in the twentieth century of the growth of political Islam and what are 
seen as increasingly conservative visions of society and with it the family,  is challenged in 
more recent scholarship. 
Key to the idea of pre-codification flexibility is the way in which the courts operated 
in pre-modern times. Coulson asserted that the new way that Islamic family law was being 
applied by states gave greater room for the recognition of social exigencies: “traditionally the 
qadi was hidebound” by rigid procedural and evidentiary rules as well as by substantive legal 
rules in his school’s manuals, “which left him little or no room for personal initiative”, while 
the current situation sees states explicitly giving wider discretion to the courts in applying 
Islamic family law “so that they now assume, to a much greater extent than hitherto, the 
responsibility of organs of real social purpose.”130 Historical scholarship on the workings of 
shari`a courts in pre-modern and early modern times (in Egypt and under the Ottomans) has 
drawn a much more nuanced picture, with the court at different times and places being very 
much tied in to the community, serving a fundamental purpose as arbitrator and mediator in 
pursuit of what the qadi would then have considered “gender and social justice”.131 In 
addition, as already noted, questions are raised as to the extent to which the traditional 
doctrine as set out in the fiqh texts reflected social (and court) practice.132 More recently still, 
as discussed further below, scholars discuss whether the script set for marital relations in 
codifications of Islamic family law across the Muslim world reflects the reality of marriage 
today in a variety of contexts: and if not, what the implications are.133 
 In a different kind of scholarship, from the 1970s, we see compilations (mostly 
translations by the authors) of different statutory interventions in different states. The first of 
these appears to have been Tahir Mahmood’s extraordinary effort, ranging over multiple 
jurisdictions in the Middle East and North Africa, South and South East Asia and Africa 
(including in the final edition statutes of Islamic family law in non-Muslim majority states) 
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and appending summaries of case law.134 Mahmood presented his work as “essentially 
descriptive” and explicitly denied any evaluative purpose in his analysis.135 He also assumed 
a certain ‘basic’ familiarity with the principles of Islamic family law; this approach is not 
followed in subsequent compilations, with El Alami and Hinchcliffe in the 1990s presenting 
an introduction on ‘the uncodified law’ before embarking on the substance of their work, 
translations of “Islamic marriage and divorce laws” in the Arab states.136 Jamal Nasir, whose 
works include one text focusing on the Arab states and one including also South Asian 
material, aims his work primarily at practitioners in the non-Muslim West as well as Muslim 
communities in Western states; he includes an introduction to Islamic jurisprudence and 
proceeds through the different areas of Islamic family law setting out the positions according 
to the different schools followed by a presentation of how those issues are dealt with in the 
different states under consideration.137  Such ‘manual’ type publications138 refer mostly to 
primary and fiqh sources and do not refer to Western scholarship around the issues discussed, 
nor do they problematize the notion of “shari`a” or “Islamic family law.” They are 
vulnerable to being quickly overtaken by the promulgation of new or modified statutes, of 
course, necessitating revisions and updates; and more recently the change in accessibility of 
statutes notably through electronic resources (let alone, as yet, the imminent transformation 
of on-line translation capabilities for the individual practitioner or researcher).  
In a sense what the last two examples of source books are doing is setting out what 
contemporary states have presented as Islamic family law in their codes compared with what 
the traditional jurists expounded as doctrine on the individual issues. Other types of 
scholarship have also to a certain extent tracked the codes, but with a focus on time and 
place-specific application in the courts. The first such effort appears to have been Layish’s 
research into shari`a court practice with Palestinian Muslims from the establishment of the 
state of Israel to the late 1960s. This informative 1975 study can be situated in its time: it is 
intended among others for “the Orientalist” and explores how “the sharia has reacted” in 
light of the fact that “[t]he traditional equilibrium between the shari`a and Muslim society 
has been irrevocably upset, not by change from within, but as a result of direct contact with a 
modern Western society.”139 Subsequent studies provide the basis for the finding, in the 21st 
century, that a “distinctive feature of recent scholarship” is the focus on local practice, away 
from “an idealized model of Islamic law to its manifold instantiations in specific times and 
places.”140 While some of these focus on court practice as read from the court records, 
including considering the practical implementation through the courts of the state 
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codifications, 141 others draw also on anthropological approaches to engage the material as 
observed in particular frames that do not take the ‘law’ as the starting point.142  
The processes of family law reform that began in what I have termed the “third 
phase” of Muslim family law reform in MENA has generated scholarship that shows the 
changed nature of interest in Muslim family law. Women’s rights are a foregrounded issue, 
along with the advocacy positions of women’s rights organisations in the national debates 
and also often involving international and diasporic women’s rights organisations, and gender 
as an analytical framework.  A collection of these “discourses on the law” were published in 
2003 as a themed issue of Islamic Law and Society looking at public debates in these 
processes,143 and another set were included in a 2009 edited collection, notably including 
Cole’s exposition of the process in transitional Iraq.144 The Egyptian law of 2000 (legislating 
for judicial khul`) has also given rise to a substantial scholarship, focusing on the text, the 
state’s textual justification of it, parliamentary and other debates. 145 Sonneveld’s recent 
monograph combines an analysis of the texts, court practice and out-of-court narratives with 
an examination of the public debate inter alia through the medium of films and cartoons.146   
Above all, the 2004 Family Code in Morocco gave rise to a veritable deluge of commentaries 
and analyses, some considerably better than others.  The volume of scholarship can be at least 
partly attributed to the invocation of international human rights discourse (particular the 
equality principle) in the debates and indeed in the law, and the engagement of the Moroccan 
authorities with the international human rights system. The availability of unofficial English 
translations of the law on-line quickly after its promulgation not only indicates interest from 
international women’s rights activists but also facilitated the production of articles on this law 
The best scholarship on the substance of this law goes beyond ‘assessments’ of the text and 
its equality provision to include reflection on court practice with a view to future amendments 
to the law.147 In line with recent scholarly interest in family law regulation among Muslim 
communities in the West, Foblets considers the implications of the new law for Moroccans 
living in Europe.148 
Away from court implementation of the codes, the influential study of the first codes 
of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia by Charrad, a  comparative-historical sociologist, 
investigates the political circumstances of the adoption of the three laws with a view to  
situating how the different postcolonial states dealt with women’s rights in their post-colonial 
family laws in light of “the relationship between state and tribe.”149 Tucker has since partly 
disputed Charrad’s findings on the relative lack of impact of women’s rights activism on the 
content of the codes, while other scholarship has also focused on the mutual and dynamic 
relationship between state formation (and development) and Islamic family law substance 
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and processes, with citizenship becoming a key frame.150 Another angle from the 1990s was 
Mayer’s 1995 suggestion that the spousal relationship in North African family law 
codifications might have more to do with ‘Mediterranean’ than with Islamic law. Mayer’s 
examination poses the prospect of higher courts taking positions such as that in Turkey on 
issues previously included in statutory law (in this case, the wife’s need for her husband’s 
consent to her work outside the home). But the scholarship on significant decisions on 
Islamic family law by higher courts in Arab countries is mostly concerned with Egypt’s 
Supreme Constitutional Court.151 This scholarship, in so far as it deals with family law, is less 
focussed on the substance of family law than on the way the Court handles the matter of its 
own interpretative authority – that is, in the Court saying what Islamic family law is. This 
scholarship considers how the Court approaches the authority of the fiqh texts, Egyptian 
statutory law (being challenged by the petitioner) and the Court’s own mandate in deciding 
whether or not a particular statutory intervention in family law was contrary to the principles 
of the shari`a. Looking at a 1996 decision on post-divorce maintenance and a 2002 ruling on 
the constitutionality of the law on khul`, Johansen tells us that “[t]he authors who are 
empowered to rethink and reformulate Islamic law and Islamic normativity are clearly 
identified by the SCC: the legislature, political authorities, expert jurists and, of course, the 
judges of the SCC.” The Court, he tell us, “relates norm production directly to political 
authority.”152 Classical fiqh norms – in our case, on family law issues - no longer bind the 
Court or indeed the legislature.153  
In South Asia, English-language scholarship, starting under British colonial rule, 
focussed primarily on jurisprudence from the courts, first under British control with eventual 
authority to the Privy Council in London, and subsequently under independent states. Under 
colonial rule, principles of English law were invoked in the interpretation of the Hanafi 
manuals available to judges, and the common law system gave precedent a status not familiar 
in civil law systems (nor yet in the traditional Islamic law system), thus lending added 
authority to the courts’ findings of what Islamic law is.  There is a voluminous literature 
examining “Anglo-Muhammad Law” or Muhammad Law, a term for which Fyzee offers an 
apology: “this ugly term as well as its variants […] are all open to serious objection.”154 
Much of this literature concerns family law, with in depth analysis and detailed examination 
of leading cases, and various authors have discussed the substantive impact of colonial-era 
scholarship and jurisprudence on Islamic family law.  Michael Anderson however suggests in 
a 1990 collection that “it would be a mistake to ascribe too much importance to the effects of 
colonial law”, noting that “indigenous processes” of scholarly study were also at work, with a 
resulting increase on “a scripturalist approach to the shari`a” in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.155 Post-independence textbooks on Islamic family law in South Asia, besides 
Fyzee’s work on India, include a large 1998 textbook by Pearl and Menski, updating previous 
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works by Pearl. The joint-authored text, which as Hirsch notes is not without its critics,156 
examines Islamic family law in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh but also includes separate and 
systematic consideration of how the English courts have dealt with what the authors term 
agrezi shariat.157  
The British colonial authorities issued certain piecemeal legislation particular to 
Muslim family law during their rule in India, some still in force, with amendments, in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as India. And judges in the highest courts in British colonial 
rule in India set precedents in case law on substantive issues of Muslim family law. In Britain 
itself however, as cases began to come to court involving migrants from South Asia and 
British Muslims particularly of South Asian origin, the state’s principle of a unified family 
law for all citizens allowed no such particularized statutory intervention. Over the last half 
century, and increasingly in common with other Western European and North American 
states, the courts have dealt with different claims, including those involving  foreign law – the 
family laws of Muslim majority states – in issues of private international law (or conflict of 
laws), but also including claims between Muslim citizens.  Scholarship on the treatment of 
dower in European and North American courts has been noted above, but there are also issues 
about the recognition of marriage and divorce processes: that is, legislatures are asked to rule 
not whether a marriage or divorce is “Islamic” but rather whether it is a marriage or divorce 
under their domestic law. In the 21st century, scholarship has tracked these developments not 
only in regard to case law158 but, increasingly, in regard to Muslim community-based 
mechanisms and their role in family law regulation in Western states. Some of this can be 
squarely placed in Hirsch’s consideration of post-9/11 anxieties on the part of states and 
majority communities; the sub-title of Berger’s 2013 timely collection (“facts, fears and the 
future of Islamic rules on family relations in the West”) points to this context of “moral 
panic”159 and includes case studies from across Europe, North America and Australia. 
Another recent collection focussing on “divorce in Islam” likewise includes a number of 
contributions from non-Muslim majority jurisdictions in Europe but also in South Africa, and 
includes similar references to anxiety on the part of non-Muslim states.160 And another, 
Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies, while not specific to Islamic family law, 
contains considerations of it in the UK, Iran, Bangladesh and South Africa, with something of 
a shared theme of legal pluralism and the standing of constitutional norms, for example of 
gender equality.161 The essays collected in Jeppie et al ‘s excellent (2010) volume, on Muslim 
Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa, are attentive to constitutional dynamics in post-colonial 
states as well as to the ‘colonization’ of Islamic family law under British and French colonial 
regimes.162 
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In the UK, initial proposals for a separate Muslim family law system came in the 
1970s; the first two Shari`a Councils were set up in the 1980s and Nielsen (who was involved 
in a contemporary cross-country study) observes that the issue for many Muslims is the 
legitimacy of the judicial authority – “it is the authority under which a judicial process 
functions, rather than the substance of the law itself which becomes a key consideration”. 
That is, it is not so much a question of “what is Islamic family law” as of “who says so”?  
More broadly Nielsen suggests that it “could be argued that the tensions regarding the wish 
for some form of shari`a family law principles to apply among Muslims living in Europe are 
– yet another - consequence of Europe’s past imperial adventures.” 163 The tensions to which 
Nielsen and others refer increased considerably in different contexts in the post 9/11 world. A 
burst of scholarship followed the public debates and government action following the 
announcement by a Muslim organisation in Canada “that it was setting up a ‘shari`a court’ in 
Ontario under the auspices of the Arbitration Act”.164 The authors detail the debates, the law 
and potential legal ramifications of the proposal and the subsequent exclusion of binding 
faith-based arbitration on family law matters; human rights obligations and Constitutional 
guarantees are evoked and the frame of citizenship is a focus, while the persistence of 
Muslim family law practice is also noted – “shari`a and talaq are alive and well”.165 A piece 
by Marion Boyd, a previous Attorney-General who was charged by the authorities with 
providing recommendations for ways forward, details the interventions by those who were in 
opposition and gives a sense of the painful nature of some of the debates.166 Sherene Razack 
provides an insightful and reflective analysis from a panel of Muslim feminists and the 
contradictions they found themselves facing: Muslims were presented as “pre-modern” in the 
debates and it is, she writes, “often through the language of human rights and gender equality 
that empire is accomplished today.”167 
Boyd’s piece is included in a volume published a few years after a second major 
public controversy on Muslim family law in the West. This was the 2008 intervention, in a 
high profile practitioner-academic lecture series on “Islam and English law”, by the then 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams. Williams proposed a “transformative 
accommodation” and was reported as referring to the “unavoidable adoption of shari`a 
law”.168 The “media storm” that ensued was followed, in due academic time, by scholarship 
that included a 2013 volume edited by the original convenor of the lecture series and 
including a particular focus on legal pluralism, particularly in relation to Muslim family law 
in the UK.169 In this context, some scholars argue for greater recognition by state law and 
courts of Muslim marriage and divorce practice with a more pluralist approach to law;170 
others are more cautionary;171 and others concentrate on the implications, mostly for women, 
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of reliance on these non-state processes, particularly in regard to securing a divorce under 
Islamic law alongside a civil divorce – the so-called ‘limping marriage’ where a marriage is 
held extant in one legal system but not in another or where a wife has obtained a civil divorce 
but is unable to obtain a religiously-recognised divorce from her Muslim husband .172 The 
frames of multiculturalism and citizenship and the paradoxes posed by attention to both 
individual and community rights are central to scholarship on mechanisms for Muslim family 
law regulation.173   Scholars also investigate the motivations of those Muslims in the West 
who engage in “Islamic marriages” without reference to registration (and therefore 
‘recognition’) processes. In the Netherlands, Moors finds that unregistered marriage among 
Muslims provokes anxiety on the part of the state about this being “an indication and 
instrument of radicalization and an attempt to develop a parallel society based on the 
shari`a.”174 That is, the anxiety is provoked not by the fact that the couple are not concluding 
a civil marriage, but rather by the fact of it being an “Islamic” marriage. Moors found no 
evidence that ideology was producing a refusal of state procedures and registration on the 
part of young women involved in such marriages but rather a wide variety of reasons for 
concluding (first, at least) an Islamic marriage. On the other hand, in the mid 2000s, scholarly 
effort in the UK went into a collaborative community-based effort to draft model Muslim 
marriage contracts presented as compliant with law in the UK,175 while in the US scholars 
reported a growing interest in the Muslim population in drafting more “personalized” Muslim 
marriage contracts – documents that are “not a generic stamp of mere legal status conferred 
by some external authority, but rather, full, detailed expressions of the way each couple 
defines itself.”176  
 At the same time, a deliberate lack of engagement with state registration procedures 
and requirements for marriage and divorce is also documented in Muslim majority states, 
sometimes presented as the normative pull of shari`a in a contested socio-political 
environment. A considerable amount of scholarship has focussed on the legal and social 
motivations and implications of marriages (notably lack of judicial remedy) conducted 
outside the state system in different Arab states, and the reactions of the public and the 
judiciary to the statutes, particularly in Egypt but also in Morocco and more recently in Syria 
and the UAE.177  In Indonesia, Bedner and Van Huis argue pragmatically against proposals 
that the state enforce more strictly its existing rules on marriage and divorce registration.178 In 
regard to ‘unofficial’ (unregistered) marriages in the Middle East and North Africa, public 
disquiet appears to have centred not so much around people marrying without the knowledge 
of the state, but at young family members (mostly females) marrying without the knowledge 
of their families. Hasso considers these “secret marriages” in Egypt and the UAE as “marital 
innovations” and notes that “customary relationships in the contemporary period are often 
interchangeably referred to as ‘secret’ marriages to stress their perceived violation of   
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‘shari`a’ and state law.”179 Her analysis of these marriages focuses on what the motivations 
are and how the courts deal with them when they are brought to their attention, often in cases 
where there is a child and the husband has disappeared or is denying the marriage, 
obstructing access to a birth certificate and therefore to other public resources.180 Hasso goes 
on to consider “misyar” or “ambulant” marriage as “secret polygyny”.181 Arabi had earlier 
considered in the context of 1990s Saudi Arabia the arguments for and against this type of 
marriage, where the wife agrees at the time of the contract to waive her rights to the husband 
providing a marital home and to maintenance, and where the secrecy paradigmatically 
involves keeping the marriage secret from an existing wife; his treatment is in the framework 
of the way in which people’s practice created pressure on Saudi authorities to recognise 
(albeit in restricted fashion) this institution, an example of what he calls “grass roots law-
making”. 182  
Carlisle’s observation-based analysis of a Damascene court’s consideration of a 
claimed out-of-court marriage focusses on the efforts by the Syrian judge to establish 
whether, according to the witnesses, “the events resulted in a valid marriage”, and to this 
purpose investigating social practices as a part of his assessment. 183 The scholarly interest in 
“Islamic family law” as understood by judges (as well as jurists) and by lay people is a 
feature of the more recent scholarship.184  We have already seen how historians have 
challenged previous accounts of Islamic family law by reviewing court records and other 
sources. This work also applies to more recent historical periods and indeed current times. 
Perhaps one of the most vivid debates on how to read court records comes in the 
disagreement between Islamic law historian Aharon Layish and anthropologist John Davis, 
published in the 1998 introduction to a collection of mid-20th century Libyan Shari`a court 
records, over half of which concern family law. Davis had collected the facsimiles of the 
records during extensive field work and subsequently made them available to Layish. In his 
introduction, Layish insists inter alia that “the historian of Islamic law makes a clear 
distinction between shari`a and tribal custom.”185 Davis disputes Layish’s notion of a 
“process of sedentarization”, arguing that “modern scholarship” contests “label-driven 
accounts” (such as nomads being ruled by custom and settled peoples by law). 
“Anthropologists and legal historians come to study law in different ways”, he tells us, and 
the events that bring people to court are linked to different contextual elements that may be 
inferred from the “event-droppings” provided by documents. “That is quite different from an 
explanation in terms of a disembodied ‘process’ – of Islamisation, or civilisation – involving 
a struggle between two bodies of law assumed to be coherent, monolithic and 
incompatible.”186 In a 2005 reflection covering the English translation of the same 
documents, Layish concedes that it is “anthropologically significant” if the Bedouin in the 
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records “identify their day-to-day legal practice indiscriminately with the shari`a”, but insists 
that “the historian of Islamic law cannot simply accept this assumption. A clear distinction 
exists between orthodox shari`a and tribal customary law, and when the Bedouin are 
following custom, the scholar must point this out.”187 Who says what Islamic law is? 
It is certainly the case that much 21st century scholarship on Islamic family law 
unsettles the more orthodox narratives of both ‘what is Islamic family law’ and ‘who says 
so’. There is considerable work on contemporary court practice, often with insights drawn 
from court observation, following the routine procedural focus of judges in adjudication and 
mediation, the work of court-appointed arbiters, litigants and their perception and conduct.188 
Some of this maps the discourses and procedures followed by the actors studied in order to 
discern, for example for Stiles, a cultural anthropologist, “when are certain cultural practices 
understood as ‘properly Islamic’ or ‘religious’ and by whom?”189 Or, in the case of Guinchi, 
introducing her court practice-focussed collection, the “religiously-inspired judicial activism” 
of judges.190 In 2006, Masud, Peters and Powers suggested that “in future scholars may want 
to focus greater attention on the work of the qadi and the process of judicial decision-
making.”191 That same volume contained an article by Baudouin Dupret that has had 
significant influence on subsequent studies. Using an Egyptian family law case to illustrate 
his argument, Dupret states that  
[t]here is no reason to assume that what people refer to as Islamic law is 
identical to a set of technical provisions that form the idealized model of Islamic 
law. Nor is there any reason to assume the contrary. To a certain extent, the 
question is not relevant. […]To the question, What is Islamic law? we should 
substitute the question, What do people do when referring to Islamic law?192  
His point is that by focussing on an assumed framework, research misses its aim. A 
later piece co-authored with Maaike Voorhoeve critiques the tendency, in scholarship on the 
legal systems of MENA, “to ascribe overarching importance to Islam in the inception and 
organisation of the law”.193 In this regard they very appositely remind us that family law is 
but one small part of the legal systems of MENA countries. They advocate “paying attention 
to practice as the only area where the law is seen to be at work” and that scholars must 
consider how Islam is invoked and referred to: “thus, ‘Islamic law’ corresponds to what 
people consider as specifically Islamic in the law, independent of any consideration about the 
truth of such a claim.”194 The articles in this collection illustrate this approach.195 Following 
Dupret in 2014, Voorhoeve applies an “ethno-methodological study of behaviour” to take the 
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statements of actors about their own behaviour at face value in her study of family law 
practice at a Tunisian court and speaks of a “new wave” of scholarship in this vein, with 
scholars who acknowledge that their data is “messy” and do not assume apriori structural 
frames through which to view it.196 
Thus, with no straightforward answers to the question “what is Islamic family law?” 
nor yet “who says so?” we move, relatively straightforwardly, to the question “Islamic 
Family Law: So what?” 
 
So What? 
In a situation where the authority of apparently agreed-upon substance, and the 
authority to pronounce thereon, are increasingly unsettled, a growing body of scholarship 
engages with what Islamic family law could/should/might be. Two recent and significant 
contributions in this regard are the collections edited by Mir-Hosseini with different 
colleagues in 2013 and 2015.197 The nature of the scholarship, and the processes that gave 
rise to the publications, are as significant as the content. The volumes engage with Muslim 
Family Law (2013) and Muslim Legal Tradition (2015) and both focus particularly on male 
authority in the family (guardianship – wilaya and qiwama), notions of gender equality and 
the “lived realities” or “social reality” of Muslim women in order to explore family law 
issues. The first collection was facilitated by the “Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief”; those involved are at pains to emphasise that “this was not an inter-religious 
dialogue, but a Muslim project, bringing together Muslim experts” from different disciplines 
and professions.198 The 2015 collection is the first output of the Knowledge Building 
Initiative of Musawah (the Global Network for Justice and Equality in the Muslim Family), 
which was launched in 2009 in Kuala Lumpur.199 Both are examples of engaged scholarship: 
an explicit aim is the “reform” of Muslim legal tradition and in particular that related to 
family law, as a basis for the reform of Muslim family law and relations. They include 
textual, philosophical and jurisprudential reinterpretations and exegetical analyses200 as well 
as situation-specific explorations of reform processes.201  Women’s and human rights are 
invoked as well as gender equality and feminist method and engagement.202 The 2015 book 
wants to “develop feminist knowledge that is grounded in Muslim tradition while engaging 
critically with it.”203 The distinctive features of this scholarship include its emergence from 
collaborative processes, not only among but between scholars, scholar-activists and activists. 
Not all scholars have welcomed this work; anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod, in a critique of 
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Musawah, is uneasy about “the new consensus in the international rights community and 
among many Muslim feminist activists and scholars that Islam and women’s human rights 
must be reconciled and that internal reform is necessary.”204 There is also disquiet at the use 
of Muslim family law as a trope for constructing  the (less than ‘civilised’) nature of Muslim 
men in the context of the imperial adventures of Western powers particularly since 9/11 and 
the complex alliances – or at least resonances - between these military and other exercises 
and certain feminist discourses in the West.205   
 Muslim feminist scholarly approaches to jurisprudence and equality arguments have 
been established since the 1990s,206 but Zainah  Anwar (a founder and former director of  
Sisters in Islam in Malaysia and a co-founder of Musawah) records increasing interest on the 
part of activists in exploring Islamic sources after the turn of the century.207  The 1990s saw 
examples of engaged scholarship involving broader networks and not involved in seeking to 
re-work Islamic jurisprudence - notably, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), 
under whose auspices two valuable collections were published in 1996, both edited by 
established scholars. Thus in WLUML’s first ‘Special dossier’ Hoodfar as editor refers to 
women “galvanizing for change” in different societies around the world and situates the 
publication as a contribution to these efforts by examining some of the strategies being used 
in different contexts.208  The second publication was an “Information Kit” on delegated talaq 
(“the Muslim woman’s contractual access to divorce”) and pertains particularly to South 
Asia, with a range of documents including the forms of different marriage contracts as well as 
academic essays and practical advice on how to draft a marriage contract containing an 
effective delegation of talaq to the wife.209 WLUML went on to produce several versions of 
an ambitious “action-research” resource book, Knowing Our Rights, looking across different 
Muslim communities and evaluating existing family law provisions and structure with a view 
to assessing the most “option-giving” for the greatest number of women affected by them (at 
the current historical moment.”210 North African scholars compiled the Guide To Equality in 
the Family in the Maghreb that in turn is cited as an inspiration for Musawah’s work.211 
Another ‘global resource book’, edited by Abdullahi An-Na`im, began life as an on-line 
project out of Emory University that subsequently produced two collections of materials 
aimed at “serving as a resource for internal initiatives aimed at expanding and protecting 
women’s rights in the family as articulated in human rights norms.”212 An-Na`im insists on 
the “futility of adopting a reductive approach to the study of Shari`a-based family law” and 
that while the material presented in his collection will indeed serve as a “resource book”, it is 
intended “also to encourage a more candid and thorough examination of the underlying 
issues.” His own position, set out in greater detail in his later publications, is “admittedly 
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controversial” as he calls for “a clear and categorical acknowledgement of the fact that family 
law in Islamic countries today is not, and indeed cannot and should not be, founded on 
Shari`a.”213  
 Thus since the 1990s we have activists working with scholars, and scholars 
identifying as ‘scholar-activists’, with manuals and ‘toolkits’ and more recently still websites 
and different forms of communication and dissemination that are used to elicit and spread 
ideas about the workings of Muslim family law in different contexts, strategies for making 
the greatest use of the law for the best protection of different areas of women’s rights in the 
family, and the prospects for reform of the law and strategies to achieve it. Interestingly, 
Tucker links this kind of advocacy to previous centuries of women ‘waging law’ by 
demanding their rights at court.214 While noting considerable opposition to this work and the 
groups carrying it out, Tucker considers that “these are the people and groups to watch in the 
near future, in light of both their energy and commitment.” 215  
Tucker’s book also illustrates the extent to which human rights law and norms are 
now invoked or implicated in Islamic family law scholarship as well as advocacy.216 Besides 
examining the advocacy campaigns, scholars may compare human rights norms (particularly 
the equality and non-discrimination norms) with institutions of Muslim family law and/or 
practice in particular post-colonial states, or consider similar issues arising in non-Muslim 
majority states in regard to their minority Muslim populations and proposals for a degree of 
legal pluralism.217 And international human rights organisations also now publish lengthy 
reports on matters of Muslim family law and practice in particular Muslim states.218  
We also see scholarship mapping and analysing family law reform processes from a 
range of angles. Some look at state procedures and processes and responses to civil society 
demands;219 some focus on women’s activism, feminist activism and women’s movements – 
and indeed individual participants therein - and how and in what circumstances their 
discourses and demands change;220 some start from a focus on citizenship to examine 
processes of Muslim family law reform or use family law as a lens through which to examine 
other subjects, such as feminism.221 In much of such scholarship, “the law” and its discourses 
certainly lose ground to discourses “on” the law; often the issue of it being “Islamic” or 
“Muslim” family law is treated entirely matter-of-factly, almost incidentally. This appears 
entirely inevitable. If there is no longer a familiar body of jurisprudence from a recognised 
source of authority who may expound and indeed expand it, then others, from non-orthodox 
academic or disciplinary backgrounds may join the debate; and the debate may become  not 
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so much about what the law is (normatively and descriptively) but what it could and perhaps 
should be. See for example the explicit attention given to “alternative forms and sources of 
knowledge” in Musawah’s compilation of women’s life stories as a way to understand the 
‘meaning’ of male guardianship and authority.222 This research is carried out precisely to 
understand how this framing of the family works in daily realities, or rather whether it does: 
in these stories, as is noted in many other context-specific examinations, the maintenance part 
of the formula is failing as man are unwilling or unable to provide for their families.223  There 
is a “disconnect” between the gendered roles and rights in the family recognised and 
endorsed by state law invoking fiqh authority and the realities of economic and social 
pressures on the family in different parts of the Muslim world.224  
Another type of scholarship that may uncover such tensions administers and analyses 
the results of opinion polls asking respondents about family law and revealing significant 
insights about what people think about the law and what they expect it to do.225  In Palestine, 
polls have shown a strong emphasis on context – so for example revealing support among 
both men and women for divorced women to have some degree of access to assets acquired 
during the course of her marriage with her former husband. Hammami and Johnson consider 
this finding to be a result of  “changes in the traditional male breadwinner/economically 
dependent wife model” and an increasing recognition of the wife’s contribution to building 
marital assets, as well as her economic vulnerability in the case of the termination of her 
marriage.226  
Concluding Remarks 
Such analyses clearly have meaning for the complex relationships of different Muslim 
constituencies with their perceptions of Muslim family law, perhaps in particular how 
different sectors and communities expect the law to produce justice, in their place and time, 
at least as much as where they expect to find its inspiration or its origin. More generally, 
English-language scholarship on Islamic (or Muslim family) law is expanding exponentially, 
within as well as beyond the disciplines with which it was traditionally associated. The state 
is no longer regarded uncritically, and approaches to Islamic family law have become – 
among other things – one lens among others through which to explore a number of different 
political and social relationships. A substantial scholarship continues to explore court practice 
in specific contexts, and to investigate the wider implications of particular concepts within 
Islamic family law and their meanings in lives lived beyond the court. The positionings of 
courts, and indeed of judges, are examined through frames beyond the substance (or text) of 
rulings. Increasing attention is paid to the way in which “lay” people – litigants, petitioners, 
their voices emerging from the historical record as well as from contemporaneous 
observation – act on their understandings of the law. Some of the most recent scholarship, 
nourished by and feeding into sustained dialogues and conversations, is purposively 
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constructed to produce fundamentally new paradigms and ways of thinking about law, 
authority and indeed the family. New voices and new critiques, as well as new challenges, are 
demanding attention;   critiques of past frames, practice and scholarship  continue to inform 
and indeed to correct; but right now,  most eyes are on those who can go some way to 
proposing how these challenges might be met.   
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